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The duration coverage in the marine
cargo insurance In light of the latest
version of the Institute Cargo
Clauses and the Jordanian and
British maritime laws
Dr. Mahmoud M. Al Qasem Ababneh
Assistant Professor of International Commercial
Law Middle East University Amman
Abstract:
This paper aims to investigate the duration clauses in the marine cargo
insurance contract as manifested in the new version issued by the Institute of
London Underwriters and Lloyds committees in 2009. The importance of this
research comes from the fact that most of the Arab Marine Insurance market
including Jordan using the Institute Cargo Clauses for insuring the goods is
shipped by sea. The duration of the insurance cover is a corner stone in the
marine insurance contract as it provides the commencement and the cases where
the insurance terminates. The complicated dispute between the two parties of
the marine insurance contract in the continuing and terminating the coverage
may invoke legal disputes. In order to enhance the understanding these new
amendments we need to explore these new Institute Cargo Clauses which have
become international clauses and interpret insurance contract and avoiding the
limited wording of the local marine insurance legislation concerning the
duration of the marine insurance contract.
Key Words; Institute cargo clauses, Duration clauses, Transit Clause,
Change of Voyage, Jordanian Maritime Commercial Law
Introduction:
It has been suggested that marine insurance rapidly and fundamentally
developed into its modern form during the last part of the fourteenth century
primarily through the influence of Italian merchants from Lombardi who had
immigrated to Britain. The three centuries of marine insurance trade that
followed resulted in the emergence and pre-eminence of the Lloyd’s of London
firm, which gave the marine insurance market in London a global dominance
over the entire industry.(1) Nonetheless, the insurance industry was not known in
(1)To trace the development of marine insurance market and explain this structure, one may start with the
origins of Lloyd’s which lie in the seventeenth century coffee house. Lloyd’s of London in the 17th
century, has played the central role in enabling the London marine insurance market to adopts a unique
system of security which works on a subscription basis. See Bennett, Howard The Law of Marine
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the Arab world before the mid of the nineteenth century.(2) The first legislation
to regulate the marine insurance in the Arab world was the Ottoman Maritime
commercial Law of 1883 which has been affected by the French and English
marine legislations. The Ottoman marine law has a section for the Marine
Insurance and it remained in force in the Arab countries until the independence
era, where some of the Arab countries started to issue more developed and
advanced maritime commercial laws, the Lebanese Maritime Trade Law was
issued in 1947, the Syrian Marine Trade Law was issued in 1950 and the
Jordanian Marine Trade Law was issued in 1944 then was replaced by the
Maritime commercial law of 1972 and remain in force until these days. All of
the mentioned countries used to duplicate the provisions of the Ottoman Law
with some minor amendments. The Ottoman Marine Trade Law remained in
force in Egypt until 1990 and it is still in force in Iraq until these days.
Although these codes are old and not in line with the modern marine trade
requirements, due to the development on ships building industry, the modern
trade methods, and the increase of the commercial transactions via the marine
transport within the world, they are still in force and didn’t influence the
development of marine insurance industry.(3) This is because the parties in the
marine insurance contract under the semi-international standard of Institute
Clauses have the right to agree on the conditions they deem appropriate. Thus
the local laws didn’t have a major impact on the marine insurance, not only in
the Arab countries but worldwide. Due to that, the Institute of London
Underwriters Clauses have been used significantly by the insurance companies
which used to attach the Institute Clauses to the policy as the terms of the
insurance contract. The Institute Clauses were first issued in 1912 and it has
been used with the historical Lloyds policy (Ship and Good) .The clauses had
been maintained in London and the Arab countries as well and was amended in
1963. The parallel operation of 1963 institute clauses with the terms of
traditional policy (S.G) created complicated interference and led to a lot of
disputes and complaints.(4) At the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) held in 1987, the traditional insurance policy was
discussed and severely criticized in many aspects.(5)
Insurance, p 1, 7
(2) Taha, Mustafa and Bondg, Anwar, Marine Insurance ,p 15
(3) See infra under Chapter 2
(4) The inefficiency of the SG policy had been revealed in many cases and was severely criticized by
Judges. For instance Buller J, described the policy as “an absurd and incoherent instrument”. Lord
Mansfield, who is considered the founder of commercial law, referred to SG policy as” a very strange
instrument as we all know and feel”, See Good acre, K Goodbye to the Memorandum, See also Arnold,
where he said that the incomprehensible treatment results in the application of two different sets of words
to the same group of facts. Gilman, Jonathan, Arnold’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, Vol 3, para
880 p 732
(5) These criticisms were followed by express recommendation: "The antiquated Lloyd’s SG Form should

26

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2015/iss62/8

[Year 29, Issue No. 62 April 2015]

2

Ababneh: ??? ????? ?? ??????? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????? ??????? ??????? ????? ??????? ?????? ( ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????????

[Dr. Mahmoud M. Al Qasem Ababneh]
In order for the London market to maintain its position as the leader in the
marine insurance industry, the London marine insurance took the initiative and
directed the Institute of London Underwriters to review the whole English
marine insurance system By January 1982, a new policy form coupled with new
standard of clauses in three types A, B, and C had been introduced and
traditional policy (S.G) which served for more than 200 years abandoned.
Although the reform in marine insurance achieved in 1982 was a radical and
successful one, but nothing remain perfect.
Recently and after 28 years from issuing the institute clauses in 1982 and
due to development on the marine trade between the countries, the use of a new
commercial terms was introduced(6) The London market realized that in order to
avoid the complications in implementing the 1982 institute cargo clauses’
version; the Institute of London Underwriters issued the 2009 version in the
three types A, B and C. The latest version included many amendments related to
the duration clause which contains three independent conditions, the Transport
clause, the Termination clause and the Change of voyage clause, those
conditions have an impact on the insurance cover commencement and
termination, in addition to the changes which might rise during the insurance
validity such as changing the final destination, using any carrying vehicle for
storage or changing the voyage route.
This research aims to analyze the recent amendments and to compare them
with the related articles in the Jordanian maritime law of the year 1972 and
some other Arab laws in light of the Arabs and British court rulings.
Research Problem (Questions):
The research problem is to identify the impacts of the latest amendments to
the institutional clauses on the three insurance duration clauses, and whether the
wording of these amendments contradicts provisions of the Jordanian Maritime
Law which regulate the commencement and termination of the insurance cover
from the loading port to the unloading port (final destination). This paper also
analyzes the meaning of the final destination which may be elected by the
insured, the validity of the insurance cover, the delay or changing of the voyage
from the normal route, and the impact on Jordanian laws which specifically
govern the marine insurance contract.

be revised and updated. The Peril Clause should be combined with the other appropriate Institute Clauses
so that the designated risks appear in one unified risk clause. UNCTAD Report 1978 Legal Secretariat
Report. Para 111.
(6) The Chamber of Commerce issued a new version of “incoterms 2010 “ which reflects the prefund
trends and change that have taken place in global trade in international commercial transactions since
2000. See International Chamber of commerce, Web-site at 30- 1- 2012.
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Research Hypothesis:
Studying the marine insurance and its commencement and termination
according to the marine insurance clauses will lead us to study the insurance
coverage for the land transportation vehicles which transfer goods and products
from the factory premises to the vessel and from the vessel to the insured’s final
warehouse, the new regulation to the coverage duration raises some assumptions
(hypotheses):
The latest amended Institute Cargo Clauses are in favour of the insured
party in comparison with the previous conditions, which were covering the
goods from outside the factory to the external gate for the insured final
warehouse.
These in some instances contradict with the insurance duration according to
the Jordanian Marine Trade Law, the question may arise whether the application
of the clauses is still legitimate and does not conflict with the implementation of
the Maritime Law.
The amendment to the duration clause was due to the development of the
maritime transport industry and the extended insurance services and the increase
in taking over the goods by the shipmasters.
The Jordanian Marine Trade Law for the year 1972, as well as most other
marine laws, does not comply with modern insurance policies. At the same time
the marine insurance market rely on the institutional clauses which we have to
analyze and comprehend.
Research Importance:
The importance of this paper appears in analyzing and enlightening the
duration clauses in the marine insurance contracts and the amendments which
took place in 2009, the fact that the institutional clauses A, B and C are
implemented in the Jordanian and the Arab’s insurance market gave this paper a
greater value.
This paper will identify the variance in regulating the duration clause as
stipulated in the English Marine Insurance Act of 1906 and the Jordanian
Maritime Commercial Law of 1972. Originally the duration of the insurance
coverage was from the port of loading until the port of unloading then it was
extended to goods cover from the exporter warehouse to the importer
warehouse, the latest institutional clauses extended the coverage by amending
the duration clause in clause 8 and the change of voyage clause in article 10, all
of the above will be discussed in light of the court ruling. As far as the
researcher knows, this paper is the first of its kind in the Arab World to discuss
the latest duration clause and to present a comprehensive understanding for the
marine insurance contracts in Jordan and the Arab world.
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Methodology:
The researcher will adopt the historical analytical comparative
methodology in order to discuss the I.C.C clauses regarding The Jordanian and
the English M.I.A to analyze and explain the new clauses and focus on the
amendments after referring to the old clauses and documents in marine
insurance, all of this will be testified by the related provisions in the English
Marine Insurance act of 1906 and the Jordanian Maritime commercial law of
1972 concerning the duration clauses and indicating to the court judgments.
Research Limitation:
The researcher will give a brief historical overview of the development of
the institutional clauses as to the duration of the marine insurance contract as a
back ground to adopt the analytical comparative method by focusing on the
relevant overview of both the English Marine Insurance Act of 1906 and the
relevant institutional cargo clauses passed in 1982. This will include presenting
the related English court ruling. Also, a comparison of the recent amendments
with the marine insurance clauses of 1982 and 2009 will reveal their impact on
both parties to the marine insurance contract. The researcher will also analyze
and discuss these clauses in comparison with duration provisions in the
Jordanian Maritime Commercial Law of 1972, and the extent to which they
comply or contradict the institutional clauses. This research will be divided into
a brief historical preamble followed by two sections:
The first section will discuss the amendments on the duration clause which
been amended to commence the insurance coverage from the actual loading at
the exporter warehouses till the unloading at the importer warehouses, and what
can affect the coverage or terminate it by the insured adjustments to unload the
goods and the impact of changing the voyage or deviate from the agreed upon
sail.
The second section will explain the articles of the Jordanian Marine Trade
that regulate the insurance cover validity and the termination events, and reveal
their lack of harmony with the amended institutional clauses which override it
and have been implemented instead of it.
This paper will end with conclusions and recommendation which the
researcher hopes to be considered in analyzing and understanding the new
insurance cover period that been implemented in Jordan recently.
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PREAMBLE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INSURANCE DURATION
CLAUSE
DURATION UNDER THE OLD DOCUMENTS
In order to better understand and evaluate the duration clauses in the current
I.C.C of 2009, it is necessary to briefly consider their background. Under the
traditional “ship and good” policy insurance was limited to the sea voyage. That
meant the risk on insured cargo did not attach until the goods were literally on
board the overseas vessel at the port of departure and terminated when the
goods were discharged and landed within a reasonable time on the quayside of
the designated port.(7) Land risks, as a result, were not covered. Likewise,
goods were not insured while in vessels moving from shore to ship and vice
versa. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, in light of significant
developments in both marine traffic and the insurance markets, limiting
coverage to the sea voyage only no longer met the demand of assureds willing
to pay for broader coverage.
The insurance markets responded with a revised provision by which
coverage was broadened to include transport risks incidental to the principal sea
voyage. This came in the form of the “warehouse to warehouse” clause,(8)
extending coverage on goods from their departure from the seller’s facility to
their arrival at the buyer’s designated location.
DURATION UNDER THE I.C.C OF 1963:
The “warehouse to warehouse” clause and other similar clauses were later
included in the I.C.C and influenced the duration of cover. For example, an
“Extended Cover” clause, dated 1 January 1958, for example, merged with the
“Warehouse to Warehouse” clause to become what was called the “Transit
Clause” in the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1963.(9) This clause showed a
significant departure from the M.I.A provision of 1906 and the Jordanian
Maritime Commercial Law of 1972. For example, it provided that coverage
could in many cases remain in force despite the occurrence of certain specified
events that would previously have terminated affect the insurance.(10)

(7) See Rule 5 of the Rules for construction of the policy. Ivamy, Hardy, Chalmer’s Marine Insurance Act
of 1906.
(8) For the first time in form of 1912 I.C.C. Although the first inclusion of the warehouse to warehouse
clause was 1912. Section 2 (1) ,f English marine insurance Act of 1906 states . A contract of marine
insurance may , by its express terms or by usage of trade, be extended so as to protect the assured against
losses on inland waters or any land which be incidental to any sea voyage “
(9) Clouse 1 of I.C.C . 1963.
(10) For example as where a deviation or a delay is beyond the control of the Assured See- s.46 and s.48 of
M.L.A of 1906 .
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DURATION UNDER THE I.C.C OF 1982:
Under the last version of I.I.C of 1982, where marine insurance documents
subjected to radical change, as the S&G policy was abandoned(11). This was a
tangible step towered modernizing and updating the insurance cover. But at the
same time the transit clause continue to cover the goods from the time they left
the seller’s warehouse, until the goods arrive at the buyer’s warehouse, so there
is no cover unless the accident happened outsides the warehouse of seller or the
buyer.
DURATION UNDER THE NEW CLAUSES OF 2009:
The London marine insurance market achieved an overhaul and change in
the construction and wording of many clauses of 1982, as far as the duration
clauses concern it is natural to amend these clauses since the time of
commercial customs and practice in marine insurance and transport has been
developed and the brokers tried to bridge the gap when they used to add new
clauses to cover the period needed to load and unload the goods on the land
vehicle.(12) No doubt that this achievement extends the cover in the transit clause
in favour of the assured.
Under the new I.C.C, duration clauses have identical clauses in all three
sets A,B, and C versions. Cover provided by transit clause (cl 8) were modified
in favor of the assured and dealt with under the third group of clauses in each
set of the clauses and headed “Duration”. The section includes three distinct
though interrelated to be read and analyzed in conjunction with each other.
These are the ‘Transit Clause (cl.8), the ‘Termination of Contract of
Carriage Clause (cl.9) and the ‘Change of Voyage clause (cl.10) ‘. Although
Clause 9 and 10 are different in wording they envisage two instances of held
cover’ clause where the effect of the insurance remains in force subject to the
prompt notice from the assured to the insurers and subject to an additional
premium being paid.
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 TRANSIT CLAUSE

Under the old I.C.C of 1982 the insurance commences once the goods
insured leave the warehouse or place of storage, the same as to the insurance
termination once the goods arrive to the gate of warehouse in final destination.
It seems that the reason behind the amendment of the clause is to satisfy the
(11) The form of ship and goods (S.G) policy adopted in its final form by Lloyd’s in 1779.It consisted of
three interrelated standard clause. The complicated and old wording of the S.G policy instigate to judges
and practitioners to criticize the structure of this old obscure of S &G policy forum.
(12) www.associatedmarine.com.au
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demands of the brokers in London marine insurance market who use to extend
the coverage to include loading and unloading operations inside the warehouse.
This means a new extension of cover, at the same time the clause adds a new
case of termination of the insurance contract as provided in the sub-clauses of
the Transit clause explained below as the following:
1.2 ATTACHMENT OF INSURANCE:
According to I.C.C. Clause 8.1, absent special agreement, insured risk does
not attach until goods leave their place of origin for the specified transit. The
word “leaving” requires physical movement of goods,(13) so “transit” does not
start until goods move outside the seller’s warehouse or storage facility
described in the policy. Assureds wanting to extend insurance coverage to
include the loading and unloading of their goods used to have to ask their
brokers to arrange for such extensions.(14) The London marine insurance
market, however, saw the opportunity provide self-standing clauses so drafters
extended coverage from the moment goods are first moved in the warehouse for
immediate loading (which requires that vehicles be available and ready to
receive them). Therefore, cover does not attach to goods either stored prior to
transit or in preparation for transit. This intention is confirmed by the words
“From the time the subject-matter insured is first moved in the warehouse or
place of storage.”
On the subject of the scope and duration of insurance coverage, it is implied
in insurance contracts that the adventure must begin within a reasonable time or
the contract is avoidable by the insurer. The question of what constitutes a
reasonable time is a matter of fact. As with other implied provisions, courts will
not generally supply an implied provision of availability where the insurer knew
the relevant facts at the time of contracting or had somehow waived the right of
avoidance. An implied condition is, of course, not applicable to open cover
contracts since they, by their very terms, state that the risk may commence at
any time during the contract term.
1.3 ORDINARY TRANSIT:
Another critical provision in Clause 8.1 is the language stating that
insurance continues during “the ordinary course of transit,” which put the
meaning of that phrase at the center of determining the duration of insurance.
The phrase denotes that goods must be carried in the customary manner by
customary means through customary routes on reasonable time schedules to
reach its destination.(15) The goods need not be in continuous motion, but must
(13) Hudson and Allen G, The Institute Clauses, p. 24
(14) Jordanian Court of Cassation, Yousef Nader company v. Gordanian French Insurance Company, Case
No. 3333/2011
(15) Goodacre, K Goodbye to the Memorandum,p.128.
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be carried from the terminus a que as specified in the policy to the agreed
terminus ad quem. Thus, for example, delays resulting from customs clearance
are not outside the ordinary course of transit, because they are expected.(16)
“Ordinary transit” under Clause 8.1 has been held to include a reasonably
parked transit vehicle. In the non-marine case of Saddler Brothers Co v.
Meredith,(17) a vehicle hauling goods from the insured company to their
destination at the Port of London stopped briefly to allow the driver to handle
necessary documents. Ten minutes later he returned to find the vehicle was
stolen. The assured claimed the loss occurred during ordinary transit and the
court agreed, holding that that “transit” means the passage of goods from one
place to another and all that is involved with the journey. The goods themselves
were in transit though the lorry carrying them was not, but rather temporarily
parked. Roskill J., reached his decision after considering facts relevant to
‘transit’ and observed:
“I think here “transit “means passage or carriage Of the goods from
one place to another and I think the goods were still being carried and
therefore were still in transit from the one place to other even though the
lorry in which they were being carried was temporarily parked”.
On the other hand stops or interruptions during transit may suspend cover if
they are unrelated, not a part of the usual delivery process, or for the assureds’
convenience. The latter case was investigated in S.C.A (Freight) v. Gibson,(18)
where a vehicle driver made a detour to obtain food and rest. During the detour
the vehicle overturned and seriously damaged the goods. The court held that
such a detour was not connected with advancing the goods’ delivery and so they
were not in “ordinary transit” when the accident occurred. Ackner J., wrote:
“Goods cease to be in transit when they are on a journey which is not in
reasonable furtherance of their carriage to their ultimate destination.”
Yet not all unexpected stops in transit will be found necessarily outside of
“ordinary transit.” A New York state appellate court considered a case where a
freight driver overtaken by darkness stopped at a motel for the night before
resuming his course.(19) The court held the stop was not outside “ordinary
transit” .
(16) Templeman, Lambeth, On Marine insurance , p 1.2 .See Goodacre, K Goodbye to the memorandum,
p129; Goodacre in his new edition of Marine Insurance Claims (1997) add that “ordinary course of transit”
includes customary means of conveyance. Customary delays, customary transshipment, See Goodacre,
Marine Insurance Claim, p 278
(17) Saddler Brothers Co v. Meredith (1963) 2 Lloyds Rep 293-311.
(18)S.C.A (Freight) v. Gibson (1974)2 Lloyd’s Rep . 533.
(19) The ORE & CHEMICAL CORPORATION v. EAGLE STAR INSURANCE COMPANY United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 489 F.2d 455 Dec. 21, 1973.
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“The true test thus appears to be not whether movement was interrupted
overnight, or over a weekend, but whether the goods, even though
temporarily at rest were still on their way with any stoppage merely
incidental to the main purpose of delivery.”
Although the foregoing are cases involving the old “warehouse to
warehouse” clause, they remain good precedents for predicting how courts will
interpret the scope of “ordinary transit,” since the ordinary course transit
provision is unchanged in L.C.C of 2009.
1.4 TERMINATION OF THE INSURANCE:
Clause 8.1 provides for marine insurance contracts to be terminated in three
distinct situations described in subsections 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.1.3 and 8.1.4
respectively. Additionally, clause 8.2 provides for an additional case of
termination. Therefore, the insurance coverage is terminated if any one of these
specific situations is found to exist.(20)
1.4.1 TERMINATION UPON DELIVERY TO THE FINAL
WAREHOUSE:
According to the old clause 8.1.1, the cover terminates on delivery to the
consignee at the warehouse stipulated or on the delivery to any place of storage
at the destination named in the policy. It follows that goods will be covered
during transit from the port of discharge to the final warehouse or place of
storage. When the goods arrive the insurance terminates even if the unloading
process does not commence. Normal delays in discharge or transit between the
port of discharge and final warehouse named in the policy once created many
disputes between consignees and insurers.(21) The new transit clause settles such
probability, when it provides; the insurance terminates normally on the
completion of unloading from the carrying vehicle or other conveyance at the
final warehouse or place of storage. The purpose of this sub-clause the term”
final warehouse or place of storage” must be the one named in the insurance
policy. Therefore, where the goods remain loaded on the carrying vehicle inside
the premises of the consignees within reasonable delay the cover still
attaches(22).
The precise circumstances that will define a ‘final warehouse’ is examined
under the new court judgment passed by the Hong Kong Commercial court. In
the case of Anbest Eloctronic Ltd. V CGU International PLC(23) where the a
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/489/489.F2d.455.27.72-2103.html
(20) Upon the test of priority of whichever shall first occur.
(21) Garfield Container Transport Inc .V Chubb Insurance Co . Court of Canada, [2002] 114A.C.W.S.(3d)
1100 , Illustrated at http//www.admiraltylaw.com/insurance.htm
(22) See under Ordinary of transit. supera.
(23)Anbest Eloctronic Ltd. V CGU international plc (2008)(HCCL 82/2000) High Court of the Hong Kong
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cargo of electronic equipment insured under all risk clauses shipped from Hong
Kong to Khor Fakan in the Eimartes of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, the
final destination was Khor Fakan and once the cargo arrived to Khor Fakan the
purchaser who bought under CIF contract moved the goods to another
destination before the completion of unloading and without informing the
insurer. Whilst the cargo was in the transit the cargo was stolen and the
purchaser refused to pay the good’s price, the seller who insured the goods in
Hong Kong filed a claim against the insurer, the insurer refused to pay
indemnity on the ground that the insurance has been terminated once the good
arrived to Khor Fakan terminal, the court dismissed his allegation and up held
the claim of the insured on the ground that the final destination has been
changed before unloading the cargo in Khor Fakan terminal therefore the court
didn’t consider that arrival at the final destination will not seize the insurance
for the reason that the insured elect another final warehouse(24). This is also
confirmed in old authorities when the old clause of transit was effective. It was
decided that the meaning of the term “final warehouse” is a question of fact. In
the case of John Martin of London Ltd v. Russell,(25) a cargo of pure refined lard
was shipped from Chicago to Liverpool. The ship arrived at the port of
Liverpool and its cargo was discharged into transit shed at the port. After two
days the lard was found to be infested with copra beetle which had moved from
another cargo stored in the transit shed. The assured claimed indemnity for the
costs incurred by removing the lard for disinfection by refrigeration. The
insurance denied liability and alleged inter alia, that insurance cover ceased
when the goods were placed in the transit shed which was considered the final
warehouse. This defense failed.
The court held that the transit shed was not the final warehouse intended by
the meaning of the old ‘Extended Cover ‘clause which provided “This
insurance…continues until the goods are delivered to the consignee or other
final warehouse as in the destination named in the policy”. It could be said that

illustrated in the below link
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=60659&QS=%2B
&TP=JU
(24) more details concerning this case to be observed, the purchaser First star Emirati company was able to
take over the cargo by obtaining illegally the delivery note from the bank and committed the theft , the
court in this issue stated that )there is a fact strongly indicated a pre-planned theft and that the goods could
have been moved from Khor Fakan to the Sharjah terminal only on First Star’s instructions) so the court
held that the loss occurred upon the goods leaving Khor Fakkan. See note 15 supra.
(25) John Martin of London Ltd v. Russell (1960) Lloyds Rep. p554 , where Person J., said: The expression
“final warehouse” seems to contemplate that there may be a warehouse which is not final. If one were
searching for an example then take a transit shed which is essentially a shed in which goods are
temporarily placed pending some further movement to some other place. The word “transit itself implies
its transitory character.” .
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the decision was based on two justifications: the first one was linguistic
justification expressed by Parson. J., as he said:
“The expression warehouse seems to contemplate that there may be a
warehouse which is not final. If one were searching for an example then
take a transit shed, which is essentially a shed in which goods are
temporarily placed pending some further movement to some other place.
The word “transit” itself implies its transitory character.”
Secondly, where the ordinary business practice of a port is to house goods
in a transit shed while they await transfer elsewhere, such goods must be
considered “goods on the quay” rather than goods at a destination. Parson, J.,
said:
“A transit shed, at any rate according to the practice of the port, is the
place at which the goods are placed as soon as they are waiting
patiently to go somewhere else. It is not the final warehouse”
This means that “final warehouse” does not necessarily indicate the
ultimate destination of a cargo should the assured chose to discharge the goods
at another warehouse within the geographical area of the named distribution.(26)
In fact this is confirmed by providing for alterative terminus in Clause 8.1.2,
which I shall now refer.
1.4.2 ALTERNATIVE WAREHOUSE OR PLACE OF STORAGE
Clause 8.1.2 provides a second cause for termination of coverage under the
concept of alternative terminus. In this situation the assured has discharged the
goods from his vessel but has not yet delivered them to the place of storage
designated in the insurance contract. He elects to discharge the goods in
another warehouse, which is only done for one of two reasons. The first is for
allocation and distribution and the other is for storage outside the ordinary
course of transit.(27) Once goods are unloaded, the insurance is terminated as
such a place would be considered the final destination in either case. Therefore,
where an assured moves goods directly to a warehouse named in the policy after
the goods were released from the shipping vehicle to the newly selected
warehouse, coverage terminates and they are not covered during transit.

(26) See the case of Anbest Eloctronic Ltd. V CGU international PLC ( 2008)(HCCL 82/2000) High Court
of the Hong Kong illustrated in the below link, discussed supra, p 11.
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=60659&QS=%2B
&TP=JU
(27) Hudson and Allen, op, at p.24 give the example of a custom’s warehouse where goods remain for
some period of time because the assured intends to defer payment of the customs’ duty . As a general
statement one can say that storage of goods when followed by unreasonable delay within the assureds’
control is deemed to be outside the ordinary course of transit and will terminate the insurance.
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1.4.3 TERMINATION UPON CHANGE OF DESTINTION AFTER
COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE
As noted previously, there are, in addition to the termination provisions of
8.1.1, 8.1.2 and 8.1.3, a fourth termination provision set forth in Clause 8.2.
Under this clause termination occurs at the time goods are discharged from a
shipping vessel and loaded on a second vessel bound for a destination not
named in the policy within sixty days. In this case termination (for purposes of
Clause 8.2) doesn’t extend beyond the beginning of transit to a second
destination. Clause 8.2 is usually significant where a sale of the goods to the
assureds’ buyer occurs prior to the end of sixty days. Here it is assumed that the
change of destination was determined by someone other than the assured. (28)
The foregoing cases of termination may be summarized by way of
requirements which may be satisfied to terminate coverage. First, goods from a
vessel must have been discharged. Second, the 60-day time limit must not have
expired. Third, the cargo must be shipped on to a destination which is not the
one designated and insured under the insurance contract. In most cases, the
destination change must be determined by someone other the assured. If these
requirements are met, Clause 8.2 provides that insurance coverage ceases at the
point which the transit to the other destination commences.
1.4.4 ON THE USING THE CARRYING VEHICLE AS A STORAGE
This is a new case of termination which has been added to the transit clause
(sub clause 8.13). This is full in the interest of the insurers, in that it envisages a
new instance of ending the cover where the assureds or their employees elect to
use the loaded carrying vehicle or any container as storage other than the
ordinary course of transit. Comparison with the old clauses of 1982, the old
clause 8.1.2 referred only to the assured decision about choosing the storage or
place of distribution, and it seems to the researcher that it was not intended to
elect the vehicle as a storage, the new clauses clarify the question by adding the
decision of the assureds’ employees in addition to the assured decision and
determined the intended suspended of transit is keep the vehicle or container or
any other land conveyance stooped as a storage. It has been suggested that
considerable care must be taken to ensure that the wording is clear and express
the intention of the contract of insurance and comply with conditions of the Sale
Contract.(29)

(28) Usually happened where contract of sale is CIF contract, the assured may indorse the bill of Lading to
another purchaser who may take the good to a new destination or place of storage.
(29) Carlson, Ulrika an article comments on the I .C.C. of 2009
http://www.if-insurance.com/web/industrial/ifnews/pages/marinenewsletter_3_2009.aspx
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1.4.5 ON THE EXPIRATION OF 60 DAYS
Termination of coverage described in Clause 8.1.4 occurs sixty days after
discharge at the destination port. The sixty-day coverage is a grace period in
which the assured can place other coverage on the goods while they’re still at
the port, and it is not insurance for any other purpose. In other words if the
assured transfers the goods during this time to another location, a loss would not
be covered even within the sixty-day period. If there is a delay, even one
outside the assureds’ control, coverage still terminates. Collecting the goods
after discharge is not relevant. The passage of sixty days terminates coverage
unless an extended by agreement. The clause appears to assume a delay will
occur prior to discharge. (30) There is time designated for the completing
discharge after a vessel’s arrival in the agreed port within a reasonable time.
1.5 VARIATIONS OF THE ADVENTURE
Many variations in transport do not affect coverage and they are explicitly
listed in Clause 8.2, and not all are outside the assureds’ control. In fact, only
one type of delay contains the words “beyond the control of the assured.” These
variations generally occur as a result of their very nature or the fact that
assureds have no control over the shipping voyage or even the terms of the
contract they sign for shipping and delivery.
Over the years insurance underwriters eventually agreed to extend coverage
over delivered goods without additional premium. One of the significant effects
of 8.1.4 is that it removes doubt over the existence of cover should certain
common circumstances arise. These circumstances are discussed below.
1.5.1 DELAY
Delay is one of the more likely variations in the list of circumstances
included in clause 8.3 normally an assured is not in position to influence the
prosecution of a voyage. Thus it refers to delay beyond an assureds’ control
during the transit after the risk has been attached and has nothing to do with the
implied warranty as to the commencement of an adventure.(31) This is because
Clause 8.3 operates while the insurance is already in force. On the other hand,
delay within the assureds’ control is governed by the Reasonable Dispatch
Clause 18. Therefore where delay within the assureds’ control takes either in the
land or sea section of a transit; it is considered a breach of both Clause 8.1 and
Clause 18. In fact, it was held in the Australian case of Verna Trading v. New
(30) in a heavily congested port, where finding a berth can take several weeks or even months as a result
of the increase in the amount the goods carried by ships. Abu Ala’ola, Ahmad, Cargo Insurance p.233
(31) Section 48 of M.I.A of 1906 states : “In the case of a verge policy the adventure insured must be
prosecuted throughout its course with reasonable dispatch , and , it without Lawful excuse it is not so
prosecuted , the insurer is discharged from liability as from the time when the delay become
unreasonable.”
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India Assurance,(32) that the goods discharged at the quay side and which
remained there for three days before they were moved to the custom warehouse,
was ‘unreasonable delay ‘ and could have been avoided by the assured. Clause
8.3 deals with delay beyond the assureds’ control and the question of whether
the delay is reasonable or unreasonable does not affect the continuation of cover
because this issue is not mentioned in the clause.(33) This would be different
where goods detained in a customs warehouse because of an absence of
necessary documents due to the negligence of the assured. The insurers in this
case would be discharged from liability from the time the delay to be within the
assureds’ control.
Unjustifiable delay or delay incurred for the assureds’ convenience falls
outside ordinary transit. In the case of Safadi v. Western Assurance
Company,(34) a cargo of cotton was insured for carriage from Manchester to
Damascus under a marine policy, which contained a “warehouse- to warehouse
“clause. The insurance provided inter alia “when the destination to which the
goods are insured is without the limits of the port of discharge of the overseas
vessel. The risk covered by this policy continues until the goods are safely
deposited in a consignee’s or other warehouse at the destination named in the
policy or until the expiry of 30 days from the time of discharge whichever may
first occur. Transshipment if any, otherwise the above, and/or delay arising from
circumstances beyond the control of the assured, held covered at premium to be
arranged”. Each of the policies covered the risk of fire. The cargo arrived at
Beirut (Beirut), was stored in the Custom House in order to be taken to
Damascus. The cotton remained longer than the 30 days’ time limit and after
this period fire broke out and destroyed the cotton. The plaintiff sough
indemnity on the grounds that although the time limit of 30 days had expired,
the delay was beyond his control, and the transit was delayed owing to the state
of insurrection and rebellion in Syria. The defendant denied liability on the
grounds (inter alia) that at the time of the fire the goods were not covered, since
the delay was under the assureds’ control and was deliberately arranged for a
commercial purpose. The court gave judgment for the defendant company.(35)

(32) Verna Trading v. New India Assurance (1989) Federal Court of Australia ( Vict, CA ) p129-172.
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/how/admiralty_cases_auststates_vic.html
(33) According to the old authorities and in the absence of the Institute Clauses application or any agreed
terms in the contract the question of Reasonableness is a matter of facts. See Howard Bennett, The Law of
Marine Insurance, 1996 p272.
(34)Safadi v. Western Assurance Company ( 1933) 46 LIL Rep p 140-145.
(35) Roche, J. observed: “ This delay in the Custom House at Beirut did not, in may view of the facts, arise
from any circumstances beyond the control of the assured but arose from the deliberate and intention of
Messrs Sabeh and Kahaleh to leave the goods there as long as it was commercially convenient to
themselves to do so”. Per Judge Roche p 143.
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If a delay occurs which is beyond the assureds’ control, Clause 8.4 provides
for continued coverage. This overrides the sometimes harsh effect of section 48,
which makes no distinction as to whether or not the assured had control or not.
Maintaining coverage during a delay that is not within the assured’s control
simplifies interpretation of the phrase “ordinary course of transit” as it appears
in Clause 8.1. The Saddler case held that a delay not within the assureds’
control was held to be a part of “ordinary transit.” However, Clause 8.3 could
have other meanings, and this is dealt with in Clause 8.1. Furthermore, Clause
8.3 is not relevant in cases where a loss is proximately caused by delay because
such a delay is expressly excluded by the exclusion of Clause 4.5.(36)
1.5.2 DEVIATION
A “deviation” is defined as a departure from the shipping vessel’s original
course as described in the policy contract but with the intention to return to the
original route and to continue to the stated destination.(37) If a vessel deviates
without excuse, the insurers are released from liability from the moment the
deviation begins.(38) The intention or decision to deviate does not affect
coverage, as in the case of a change of voyage where intent does matter.(39)
Furthermore, the vessel’s return to the original course does not reinstate
coverage.(40)
Following the permission of delay beyond the assureds’ control, Clause 8.3
goes on to provide continuous coverage during “any deviation,” though
departure is excused by those circumstances set forth in section 49.
Nevertheless, coverage in cases of deviation, whether within or without the
assured’s control, remains subject to provisions of Clauses 8.1.1, 8.1.4 and 9.
The phrase “any deviation” must be considered carefully no matter what
descriptive language is used. The phrase was originally subject to two welldefined limitations: first, only ports which lie on usual routes between two
termini may be used, and the ship must travel between them as denoted in the
(36) Clause 4.5 states:” In no case shall this insurance cover: Loss, damage or expenses proximately
caused by delay, even though the delay be caused by a risk insured against( except expenses payable
under Clause” relating to general average or salvage charges”.
(37) O’May R, Marine insurance – Law and practice- London (1993).
(38) It is important to note that the ship should deviate in fact, since intention to deviate’ is immaterial.
This is unlike ‘change of voyage ‘which is from the time the decision is made to change. The
consequences reflect the limit of the underwriters’ liability. In the case of deviation the underwriters would
be liable all insured losses occurring before the actual deviation, whereas in the latter case the underwriters
would be discharged from liability from the time the decision to change the voyage declared, irrespective
of whether the ship continued on the same course for a while before the change had taken place. See also s
. 45 of M.I.A. Furthermore, in the case of deviation the insurers could avoid the contract even if a vessel
regained her original route before any loss occurred.
(39) Bennet, The Law of marine Insurance. p 270-272
(40) See Shoukry,Baheej, marine insurance , practice and legislation , Dar . p. 646.
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policy. If the policy describes destination ports in a specified geographical area,
the ship must proceed to them in their geographical order. Second, the route
followed must only be taken for purposes related to the principal object of the
venture.
The “excuse circumstances” of deviation in the sea portion of a shipping
itinerary are the same as those for delay in the M.I.A. section 49(1). Practically
speaking these excuse conditions are provided in the standard clauses.
Although the Transit Clause (cl. 8) applies to both the land and sea portions
of a shipping itinerary, whether Clause 8.3 also applies to land and sea is
unclear. Some ambiguity is found in the language of the clause:
“any deviation, forced discharge, reshipment or transshipment and
during any variation of the adventure arising from the exercise of a
liberty granted to ship-owner or charterers under the contract of
carriage”.
So, does Clause 8.3 apply only to “ship-owner or charterers” as the
language itself seems to indicates, or is it intended to include deviation during
the land portion of the journey as well, since this seems consistent with the
purpose for the deviation rule? For example, goods insured under the transit
clause were shipped from an Aqaba warehouse to an Irbid warehouse. The
goods made it as far as Salt, where they were then loaded on trucks bound for
Irbid. However, those trucks drove first to Amman before continuing on to
Irbid, which is a much longer route. Is this a deviation under Clause 8.3? It is
unlikely that clause 8.3 was intended to be limited to sea deviations only,
because that doesn’t achieve the main object of the Transit Clause which is to
standardize logical definitions for the whole voyage. Furthermore, the word
“delay in Clause 8.3 seems equally applicable to both land and sea segments of
a journey that involves both. We should remember that the drafting of the clause
must not contradict the intended meaning of the duration clauses.
It is rare to encounter an instance of deviation that is within an assureds’
control. This doctrine is important in the context of the laws of carrying goods
over sea; however, references to deviation in marine insurance contracts are
older than references to deviation in sea carriage contracts.(41)
1.5.3
RESHIPMENT,
TRANSHIPMENT
AND
FORCED
DISCHARGE
The terms “reshipment or transshipment” denote the movement of insured
cargo from one vessel to another.(42) Before enactment of M.I.A. in 1906,
(41) Gilman, Jonthan, Arnold’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, Vol 3, para 464- 466 p 298
(42) Mousa, Mohamed The Subject of Marine Insurance, p. 31. See also Sarko, Yakoub Marine insurance
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transshipment terminated insurance coverage.(43) Coverage might be continued
through agreement of the parties or in circumstances of necessity where
continuing the journey in the original vessel is impossible. Section 59 of the
M.I.A in 1906 treated transshipment and reshipment as arising out of necessity,
and provided for continuation of coverage on the assumption that any change in
vessel must result from an insured risk. Later, section 59 was broadened in the
subsequent I.C.C to be similar to Clause 8.3 of 1982, providing continuing
coverage in cases where transshipment occurs for reasons that are outside of the
assured’s control.
Reshipment, transshipment or forced discharge does not affect duration of
coverage under Clause 8.3, although it may constitute a significant variation.
This highlights the importance of Section 59 of M.I.A, since because of Clause
8.3, coverage is not dependent upon any insured peril. Furthermore,
transshipment and re-shipment are not limited to sea shipment, as one might
expect under the terms of M.I.A 1906.(44) Instead it governs transfers to or from
any customary means of conveyance conducted in a usual manner.(45) Clause 8.3
is unlikely to deviate from the main thrust of clause 8, which governs both parts
of the transit. Forced discharge often takes place when a shipment is thwarted
for reasons clearly beyond the assureds’ control, such as war. Coverage
continues since the material insured in the shipment includes the cargo and the
safe fulfillment of the voyage.
1.5.4 ANY VARIATION OF THE ADVENTURE.
The final section of Clause 8.3 states that any variation permitted under a
contract of affreightment does not affect coverage. Thus, if a carrier terminates
a shipment contract because it cannot be completed, this would not terminate
the cover so long as it was beyond the assureds’ control. This is reasonable
since the assured has little or no control over the circumstances of the voyage.
Even so, since variations avoidable by the assured are deemed outside the
ordinary course of transit, they necessarily terminate coverage.(46) If the assured
knows of a variation he must inform underwriters at the time of contracting, or
the insurer may set aside the contract for non-disclosure of a fact material to the
contract.

in the Kuwaiti law, p. 309.
(43) Arnold para 403 p. 32.
(44) It should be remembered that S.59 of M.I.A refers to the sea voyage only.
(45) Where section 59 uses the word ‘ Voyage’ and Clause 8.3 uses the word ‘adventure’. it is to
emphasize that transshipment could be possible during the land section of the transit whatever the means
used.. from train to train or vehicle to vehicle .
(46) See the concept of ordinary course of transit, supra p. 8
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1.6 TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE (cl.9)
Clause 9 is basically a termination clause.(47) It provides for termination of
the insurance where circumstances are beyond the control of an assured. Either
the contract of carriage is terminated at a port or place other than the final
destination named in the policy, or the transit is otherwise terminated before the
completion of discharge of the goods as provided for in Clause 8.
Clause 9 is in substance the old “Termination of Adventure” clause (cl.2) in
I.C.C. of 1982. Only some minor changes in the wording. For example, the
term “delivery” in the former clause appears as “unloading” in order to make it
consistent with clause 8. As far as minor language changes in the current clause
are concerned, some suggest these changes were made to give a more accurate
description of the role of the clause.(48)
Carriage contracts may be terminated in a number of circumstances, such as
where the destination port is under siege or embargo, or port workers initiate a
strike, or war breaks out in the area, or where a carrier becomes unable to
complete a voyage due to his insolvency. In all these circumstances the voyage
may be abandoned short of the destination agreed.
The assured, however, is given a chance to request continuation of
insurance by giving prompt notice to the insurer, who then charge an additional
premium. Thus, where facts of termination are within the assureds’ control, this
clause doesn’t give the assured continued coverage because it is terminated
from moment the contract of carriage is terminated.
These opportunities have their limits, and Clauses 9.1 and 9.2 make this
clear. However, certain circumstances must exist in order for Clause 9 to
prevent automatic termination of coverage. First, termination must be outside of
the assureds’ control. Second, the assured must give a timely notice, acting with
reasonable dispatch. Further, the notice must be combined with a request for
continuation of coverage and a willingness to pay additional premium if
requested. Third, termination of coverage must be

(47) Clause 9 is subject to automation unless a prompt notice is issued by the assured, whereas in clause
8.3, the insurance remains in force without a need to issue a notice. See Clause 8.3.
(48) Grime, Robert Insuring Cargos in the 1990s’ p. 126 . These alterations are manifested by dropping the
term ‘adventure’ from the title and text. Also the term ‘ affreightment’ has been replaced by the word
‘transit’ and carriage’ , See cl 2 in I.C.C.,1963. The practical significance of these change may be realized ‘
where there is more than one contract of carriage and transit embraces a land section . The editors of the Ist
supplement of Arnould (1997) suggested that the maritime language of ‘ Contract of affreightment ‘ might
not be an apt phrase for contract involved with the movement of goods on land . See Arnould op.cit, Vol.3
para 271 p.167 .
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“at a port or place other than the destination named therein or the transit
otherwise terminated before the completion of discharge the goods
provided for in Clause 8.”
This clarifies two points. The word “otherwise” gives reasons for
termination and not places. Also, normal completion of discharge of the goods
according to this clause includes contemplated in sub-clauses (8.1.1 and 8.1.2).
1.6.1 THE GRANTED COVER
Having met these requirements the assured, according to Clause 9.1, has
automatic continuance of insurance until the goods are sold and unloaded to the
stipulated destination. This means that the mere passing of property does not
necessarily end the cover. Alternatively, cover is granted for a period not
exceeding 60 days from the time the goods arrive at an intermediate port or
place. Here it is argued that word “arrival” may provoke different
interpretations and give rise to dispute.(49)
Problems may arise when such circumstances produce controversy between
carrier and assured. For example, if a carrier suspects a cargo to be illegal, or an
important document is found to be missing or damaged it can also be argued
that the “automatic termination” position adopted by Clause 9 could give rise to
some problems if relatively few days have elapsed between the time of
termination and the time of delivery of the required prompt notice. In the
Jordanian case of Abdulkader Moh’d v. Jerusalem Insurance Co Ltd. the
carrying vessel (Cedaerff) which was heading for Aqaba, had been blocked by
an American warship and consequently the port of destination was changed to
Jeddah. It was held that the assured ought to have given prompt notice once he
was aware of the blockade and not three days after the ship had discharged its
cargo in Jeddah. (50)
The continuation of cover provided by cl 9.1 and cl 9.2 is limited, as the
granted cover terminates according to the course of action the assured elects to
take over his goods.(51) However, such circumstances can be summarized as
follows: the expiry of 60 days after discharge at the intermediate port and when
goods are sold and delivered prior to the expiry of the 60 days ‘time limit,
whichever occur first. Termination of the granted cover according to Clause 9.2
is associated with clause 8 by virtue of the insurance terminating if goods have
(49) . This is because no reference is made to the term ‘arrival’ either in the clauses or in the M.I.A. It is
suggested that the term in clause 5 of the Institute War Clauses could apply.
(50) Abdulkader Moh’d v. Jerusalem Insurance Co Ltd (1994) Jordanian Appeal court 194, the case did
not reach the cassation court , as the assured and P.I. Clubs reach a reconciliation .The American warship
was used to impose a block on the port of Aqaba in order to subject the ship to a thorough inspection to
ascertain whether the goods on board belonged to Iraqi market.
(51) See Supra note No1,p10.
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been forwarded to their original destination, or some other destination, within a
60-day period according to the provision of the Transit Clause. This means that
if the instances of termination in Clauses 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.1.3, 8.14 and 8.2 have
taken place before the termination of a contract of carriage or transit, the
assured cannot rely on Clause 9.
Determining when coverage terminates under Clause 8 can be somewhat
confusing because Clause 8.1.3 provides for termination 60 days after discharge
at the final port of destination, while Clause 9.2 provides that termination occurs
60 days after discharge at “any other destination in addition to the final port of
discharge.” One might conclude that goods covered under Clause 9.2 didn’t
reach the final port of discharge but were discharged at some other port. Does
Clause 8.1.3 or Clause 9.2 apply? Further, Clause 8.3 provides coverage “during
any variation of the adventure arising from the exercise of a liberty granted to a
ship-owner or charters under the contract of carriage affreightment.” This
provision seems to require “termination of the contract of carriage” and may be
better handled under Clause 9, since the coverage approach is different there
from the approach in Clause 8.(52) There is an apparent contradiction between
Clause 8.3 and Clause 9 regarding the termination of carriage coverage, because
in the former situation continuation of coverage is automatic without the need
for any sort of notice. However, Clause 9 indicates termination in the same
circumstances unless prompt notice is given.
1.6.2 CHANGE OF VOYAGE IN THE M.I.A ACT of 1906
Section 45 of the Marine Insurance Act provides that ‘Change of voyage’
means the voluntary change of the terminus ad quem after attachment of the
risk.(53)
As a result, unless there has been a stipulation to the contrary in the policy,
wherever there has been a change of voyage, underwriters are discharged from
liability from the point when the decision to change was made. It is irrelevant
whether or not the ship had actually left its proper course when the loss took
place. (54)
It logically follows that a deviation is clearly different from a change of
voyage. First, changes in voyage involve one of the voyage termini being
changed. Second, because underwriters are discharged from liability for a
deviation only where the vessel deviated in fact. Changes of voyage only
(52) Clause 9 is subject to automatic termination unless a prompt notice is issued by the assured, whereas
in Clause 8.3, the insurance remains in force without the need to issue the notice. See Clause 8.3.
(53) Section 45 reads: “Where after the commencement of the risk, the destination of the ship is voluntarily
changed from the destination contemplated by the policy, there is said to be a change of voyage”
(54) See chimer’s Marine insurance. act 1906 , London -2010, p.67 .
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require a decision to change the destination of the ship. Recall that Section 45
comes into operation when a voyage commences and the risk attaches. If a
decision to change the destination was made before the commencement of the
voyage, the case is not a ‘change of voyage’ since the risk did not yet attach.
The same would be the case where a voyage commenced from a place other
than the one specified in the policy.
1.6.3 THE OPERATION OF THE CLAUSE ( cl 10 ).
According to section 45(1) of the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 there said
to be a change of voyage where after the commencement of the risk, the
destination of the ship is voluntarily changed from destination contemplated by
the policy.
The new clause of change of voyage makes the change of voyage more
obvious and clear. It deals with two distinct but interrelated cases of change of
voyage. The first one when once risk is attached after sailing and then the final
destination voluntarily by the assured the assured may still enjoy right to obtain
insurance cover subject to a prompt note to the insurers but only if he meets
certain requirements. It is unnecessary that the change of destination be made by
the assured. It is sufficient that the intention to change the voyage is clearly
evident. For example, this may exist where the assured instructs the master to
change the agreed upon terminus ad quem, (by radio, for example). In order for
the assured to obtain coverage, there are three requirements under the clause.
The first is that the assured has to give ‘prompt notice’ as soon as he chooses to
alter the route. The time permitted between the determination of route alteration
and the issuance of notice must be according to the ‘Note’ to reach an
agreement between the parties. Second, the assured must pay an additional
premium, which must be a reasonable market sum agreed to by all parties to the
contract.(55) These matters are factual issues in each case.(56) Third, if a loss
occurs prior to the parties reaching an agreement, coverage may be purchased at
a new rate and at reasonable market prices.
The previous voyage alteration clause of 1982 (Clause 10) did not address
what happens if a destination is changed by a party other than the assured or by

(55) See M.I.A, s 3131 and s. 88 of the M.I.A of 1096. If the parties cannot reach an agreement on the
additional premium, proceeding can be undertaken to fix a reasonable amount for it . See Arnould , Vol 3
op . cit , para 277 , p . 169. It has also been suggested that the ‘Held Covered’ clauses do not customarily
carry any expiree Limitation on the power of underwriters to amend the terms of the cover and demand an
additional premium. These are powers that must be exercised in reasonable majer terms appropriate to the
nature and degree of the additional risks. See Thomas op.cit, p.25.
(56) Circumstances considered for fixing reasonable commercial premiums are, for example: change
involving a longer voyage or one which has become more hazardous. See Liberian Insurance Agency Inc.
v.Mosse (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep.560. The word ‘arranged ‘shall be deemed to mean “agreed” or, in default
of agreement, fixed by an arbitrator or by the court; Ibid. at p.568.

46

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2015/iss62/8

[Year 29, Issue No. 62 April 2015]

22

Ababneh: ??? ????? ?? ??????? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????? ??????? ??????? ????? ??????? ?????? ( ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????????

[Dr. Mahmoud M. Al Qasem Ababneh]
facts outside of his control. The new clause of 2009 was sure to address that
issue. The second portion of the clause provides that where the subject-matter
insured commence the transit in according to the transit clause cl 8.1 and the
ship change the transit without the assured or his employees knowledge, the risk
attach once the change of transit commence and the innocent assured still enjoy
coverage.(57) It seems that the increased phenomenon of the so called “ phantom
ship” cases in which a ship with false papers, take the cargo to another place
other than the destination agreed and sell the goods is behind the amendment of
clause 10. Therefore, whenever the destination change by someone other than
the assured or by circumstances beyond his control,(58) mostly a dishonest act by
the captain. In fact the reason behind this edition in the clause is combat the
maritime fraud may be committed by the master of the ship.
1.6.4 PROMPT NOTE
The word ‘note’ points to the right to be ‘held coverage’ depends on the
assured giving timely notice to the underwriters that describes events that give
rise to his entitlement to continued coverage. The word “prompt” means that the
assured must notify the insurer immediately before he becomes aware of an
event that might terminate coverage under a contract of carriage (cl .9) .(59)
The foot of I.C.C. contains the Held Cover Note, it appears in this section
because it primarily serves as a reminder of the unwritten but implied term that
invokes a “held covered” provision be conditioned upon underwriters being
given prompt notice. Clauses 9 and 10 serve as appropriate examples in which
the notes are significant to the ‘held covered’ provisions which attempt to keep
coverage in place.
Whether notice meets the requirement of promptness (i.e., within a
reasonable time after learning of a variation of the risk) depends upon the
precise factual circumstances of the case, considering that insurance contracts
require good faith. Ignoring obligations imposed by the note allows an insurer to
be released from liability from the point the assured failed to deliver the
required notice. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that some
coverage provisions in the I.C.C. impose on assureds an obligation to deliver
prompt notice to their insurer.

(57) Carlson, Ulrika an article comments on the I .C.C. of 2009 .
(58) R.R. Cornah , institute cargo clauses of 2009 , an article of 12 page commenting in the new clause .
www.rhig.com.
(59) At the foot of all three sets of clauses A,B, and C a supplementary note appears in italics and states :
“It is necessary for the Assured when they become aware of an event which is’ held covered ‘ under this
insurance to give prompt notice to the Underwriters and the right to such cover is dependent upon
compliance with this obligation”
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CHAPTER TWO
DURATION OF COVER UNDER THE JORDANIAN MARITIME
COMMERCLAL LAW.
2.1 Transit in the Jordanian Maritime commercial Law
Although the J.M.C.L. was enacted in 1972 it does not extend cover to
embrace the land section of the transit.(60) This shows how far the influence of
the old SG policy from affected the marine insurance law in Jordan.(61)
However, this matter have been justified at the time of the enactment of the
British Marine Insurance Act of 1906 , when the idea of ‘warehouse to
warehouse ‘transit had not been completely developed . But as the Jordanian
Maritime Commercial Law was enacted at a time when the ‘warehouse to
warehouse’ clause was well recognized and practiced, the legislator should have
complied with its concept warehouse to warehouse clause is a modern principle
of marine insurance introduced by the I.C.C together with the philosophy of the
civil law system in the Jordanian legal system, where the main interpretation is
through the provision of the law in the absence of a contractual agreement. This
in fact has been taken in consideration when the Egyptian enacted their
maritime law in 1990.(62)
The J.M.C.L of 1972 has dealt with the duration of insurance for both hull
and cargo insurance together. Section 345 of J.M.C.L reads:
“If the subject-matter insured is the hull of the ship, and the duration of
risks is not specified in the contract, then the risks insured against under
a voyage policy shall start to run as from the time of sailing or weighing
anchor of the ship, and shall terminate when the ship is at the port of
destination or alongside the quay.
If, however, the ship carries a cargo of goods, the risks shall start to run
as from the time when loading of the goods commences, and shall
terminate when off-loading is completed, provided that the duration
shall not extend beyond fifteen days after the arrival of the ship at the
port of destination unless goods for another voyage are loaded at the
port of destination before the lapse of the aforesaid period of fifteen
days, in which case the risk insured against shall terminate forthwith.”

(60) Jordanian court of Cassation, Damnon Arab insurance Company v. Watheq Kate’a Habeeb case No.
2885/2001
(61) See section 345 of the Jordanian Maritime Commercial Law of 1972.
(62) See Taha, Mustafa and Bondg, Anwar Marine Insurance, p227. See also section 388 which provides:
The effective of insurance must continue without interruption in any place during the voyage compliance
with terms agreed in the policy.
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As far as cargo insurance is concerned, the second paragraph of the section
pinpoints the fact that the duration of cover starts from the time of loading a
vessel and terminates upon the occurrence of one or more of the possible
circumstances.(63) Firstly, termination occurs when the discharge of the goods is
completed. Secondly, and alternatively, the cover may be terminated on the
expiry of 15 days commencing from the time of arrival at the port of
destination. Thirdly, according to the aforesaid provision, the cover may come
to an end before the expiry of the 15 days if the goods are moved to another
destination. In this case the cover ceases immediately.
In light of the above the observation may be made that the provision reveals
many lacunas; the first is the time limit of 15 days starts at the time of arrival
and not from the time of completion of discharge at the port of destination, as is
the case in the I.C.C of 2009, where the insurance remain effective for sixty
days after completion of discharge from the overseas ship in the port of
destination.
This means if a ship arrives at a congested port or where the port is strikebound, time may run out and the assured will find himself out cover before the
discharge of his goods. The provision of section 345 of J.M.C.L could be more
acceptable if the 15 days were to start after the completion of the discharge of
the goods at the port of destination. At the same time the legislator has to
prevent any interference by the carrier to prematurely end the time limit.
Again the Jordanian legislator has dealt with the insurance “from under
ship’s tackle to under ship’s tackle’ in section 347. The risk in this case runs
“from the time the goods leave the quayside of port of departure in order to be
loaded “, and terminates when the goods are discharged on the quay at the port
of destination. In the second paragraph of the provision the transit by craft from
the port to the ship and vice versa, has been embraced. It is clear that the cover
provided under section 345 which deals with cargo cover is more restrictive
than section 347 , although the sentence “The risk shall start to run from the
time when the goods leave the land in order to be loaded” , is quite confusing .
Does this extend as far as to embrace transit from the warehouse of the assured?
Or does it indicate the time when the goods leave the quay in order to be loaded
into the vessel? Furthermore, the J.M.C.L does not express an opinion in case of
delay when dealing with the commencement of a voyage. It is become obvious
that the Jordanian Maritime Law does not defer too much from the English
Maritime Law as stated in article 48 of the Marine Insurance Act regarding the
attachment of the insurance which has been specified at the time of the shipment
of the goods on the board of the vessel, the only clear difference that the Marine
(63) Ivamy, Hardy Charlmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906
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Insurance Act dealt with the delay while the Jordanian did not. However this
treatment doesn’t hold any importance neither in the English nor in the
Jordanian laws where the parties follow the new set of the Institute Cargo
Clauses which is dealing with the delay out of the insured control. Regarding
the unreasonable delay we pointed out that this matter is lifted to the assessment
of judiciary.
2.2 CHANGE OF VOYAGE IN J.M.C.L
The J.M.C.L has dealt with the ‘change of voyage, issue in section 348.
According to this section, the J.M.C.L distinguishes between two circumstances
of change of voyage. The first one deals with circumstances when the intention
to change a voyage becomes manifest after sailing. In this case the insurance
company is not liable for the risk which might occur. Up to this point the
provision quite clearly overlaps with section 45 of M.I.A of 1906. But the
consequences of such a change are different , because where change occurs
according to section 45 of the English M.I.A. the insurers are not liable for any
consequent loss, whereas the ‘ change of voyage’ under J.M.C.L does not
merely terminate a contract of insurance , but also entitles the insurers to claim
compensation. Section 348 of the J.M.C.L reads:
“If any change in the voyage is intentionally made after departure of the
ship, the insurer shall have the right to compensation and he shall not be
liable for the risks. If such change occurs before the sailing of the ship
the insurance shall be void and the insurer shall be entitled to receive
half the premium specified in the contract as fixed compensation”.
The second circumstance of change of voyage is where the decision to
change is made before sailing from the port of departure. In this case the
contract of insurance is deemed to be void, and the insurers would be entitled to
claim for half the premium as fixed compensation. (64) Except for the issue of
compensation this echoes the non-attachment of the risk according to s. 43 and
44 of the M.I.A.
It is very interesting to note that the provisions dealing with ‘change of
voyage’ end without offering a specific legal definition of it nor they pinpoint
the essential requirements of change of voyage. Such omissions cannot be
bridged by incorporating the I.C.C. because they do not present a definition.
This task is left to the law in the English marine insurance system. In a country
where a civil law system is applied it sounds a serious weakness and needs to be
dealt with urgently. Although, the provision insists that the change must be

(64) Although the English Marine Insurance Act of 1906 consist with the Jordanian one on the failure of
consideration of the contract. The English Act entitled the assured to restore the all the premium paid. See
Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 84(1).
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intentional, the J.M.C.L makes no reference to which changes are meant. The
provision provides ‘if any change in the voyage is intentionally made after”.
The general term “any change “could be understood to be a change of course in
navigation, or a change of date of arrival, or a change of the date of the
commencement of a voyage. Moreover, the essential word “destination” which
is the crucial word in a ‘change of voyage’ has been missed out. Furthermore,
the J.M.C.L considers the circumstances of change before sailing from the port
specified as a case of change of voyage, whereas such a change is considered a
different voyage. Where change of voyage occurs after sailing from the port of
departure the law does not specify from what time the insurers would be
discharged from their liability.
Finally, the provision of section 348 is designed to deal with a change of
voyage under relevant circumstances which can be illustrated clearly in law. If
certain issues can be overridden by the I.C.C of 2009 which are applicable in
the Jordanian marine insurance market, there are provisions which cannot be
overridden and their violation render void any contrary agreement such as noted
in the second part of section 348.
2.3 DEVIATION IN J.M.C.L
As a consequence the law moved to deal with the circumstances of a “ship
astray” which could also be a case of deviation. Section 349 of J.M.C.L. reads:
“if the ship goes astray the risks encountered while it was on its correct
course shall be insured , provided that the insurer shall have right to
prove that such risks were the result of the ship going astray”.
The Jordanian legislator has already assumed that such a case of deviation
occurred unintentionally, although the word ‘deviation’ has been missed out.
This is indicated by use of the word’ astray ‘(65) One consequence of a ship
going astray is that the insurers would remain liable for any occurrence which
might take place before its departure from its proper course of navigation. This
simply means they would not be responsible for any risk after the ship had
deviated. The provision provides that insurers shall have the right to prove that
such risks were the result of the ship being off its prescribed course. Such an
emphasis on the insurers’ rights is undue’ because it is normally accepted that
insurers have to disprove an assureds’ allegation. Nor does the provision decide
the fate of the cover when a ship regains her course, because section 349 does
not mention such a possibility. While the English Marine Insurance Act pin

(65) Baheeg Shoukrey comment in using astray which mean the ship get lost in the sea saying that the
Arab Legislator did not keep following the updating technology the carriage of good by sea , since ship
going astray is same thing from the past .see Shoukrey, Baheeg marine insurance, p 189-190
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pointed this issue clearly as returning after deviation to the original route does
not make the insurance attached.
However, marine insurance practice in the Arab world marine insurance
market including Jordan owes a lot to the use of the Institute Cargo Clauses,
because some of the bizarre provisions as contained in Jordanian Maritime
Commercial law, can be overridden in a contract of marine cargo insurance
when the parties add the version of the clauses as the terms of the contract.
Unfortunately, some issues cannot be defined, such as the definitions of ‘change
of voyage’ or deviation in the clauses.
The Jordanian Maritime Commercial Law of 1972 and most of the Arab
maritime commercial legislations legalized the using of these clauses as the
result of the “common will” of the parties agreement. Section 297 of J.M.C.L
states:
“All the provisions of this part which do not contain an express
stipulation to the effect that shall be applicable not withstanding any
agreement to the contrary, or to the effect that their violation shall render
void any contrary agreement, shall only be regarded as interpreting the
will of the contracting parties and be superseded by express provisions”.
This provision in J.M.C.L is identical to be found in many Arab marine
laws.
2.4 DELAY IN J.M.C.L
As we mentioned above; delay has not been treated by the Jordanian
Maritime Law in the transit operation except in article 337 which states “No
claim may be made against the insurers for any delay in dispatch or arrival of
the goods, or for any difference in the prices or any obstruction caused to the
business transaction of the assured resulting from any cause whatsoever”.
Therefore delay considered as an excluded risk which is echoes to clause
4.5of the Institute Cargo Clauses, but as the clause 8.4 is applicable and it dealt
with the delay beyond the assured control during the marine transit or on the
arrival of the cargo to the place of destination, this will bridge the gap in the
Jordanian Maritime Law as the parties have to comply with the contract of
marine insurance and the attached Institute Cargo Clauses.
CONCLUSION:
From the analysis of the Duration Clauses specified in the sub clauses 8, 9
and 10 of the institute cargo clause of 2009, it would appear that the
complications and the restricted cover given to assureds according to the
duration clause of 1982 does not exist. The duration of cover has extended to
contemplate a new phase in addition to the transit period; it encompasses the
process of loading the goods in the warehouse of the sellers and extended the
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termination of the insurance until the cargo has been discharged from the
vehicle or any inland conveyance in the final warehouse. The new clauses also
take a heavy consideration to the innocent assured who may lose the cargo when
the ship alter the transit and act as a phantom ship. This falls in the interest of
the assured, and responds to the needs of the marine insurance market
worldwide to combat the maritime fraud committed by some ship masters.
When comparing the provisions governing the duration of insurance in
J.M.C.L. with the better organized sections of their counterparts in the English
M.I.A, both of them fall short of the progressive and all-embracing nature of the
‘transit Clause ‘which embraces the sea and land sections of transit and both of
which may hinder any broader interpretation of the concept of change of voyage
and deviation from the I.C.C. of 2009. Unfortunately the effect of the ambiguity
created by the draftsmen would have, under the Jordanian system even more
negative effects. This is because the Jordanian legal system lacks the richness of
accumulated precedent cases and the interpretation of the contract is limited to
the statutory provisions which have to be complied with, unless there is a clear
indication in the stipulated terms to the contrary. The practical terms are using
the Institute cargo Clauses. The researcher hopes that by analyzing the new
version of the I.C.C of 2009 may contribute to explaining the meaning and the
reasons behind the last amendments in the world of marine insurance
concerning the duration of marine cargo insurance contract.
Recommendations:
1- In the light of international character of institute clauses and their worldwide use including Jordan and the Arab countries, the researcher calls
for more focusing and encouraging the insurance company to apply the
new versions of 2009 instead of 1982 version . Due to the clarity of the
new clauses and for the interest of the assureds.
2- It is time to review the Jordanian marine insurance law and other Arab
legislation to bridge the gap between the duration in the institute cargo
clauses and their counterpart of the related provisions in maritime law.
3- The amended change of voyage clause is worth to be considered when
the assured elect to insure according to the new version of the clauses
and this also call for revising the change of voyage clause in the
maritime local legislation to enhance the combating the phenomena of
the maritime fraud.
4- The researcher calls on the Arab Federation of Insurance and the
Jordanian Federation of Insurance Company to conduct a seminar to
explain and discuss the duration clause in light of the new amendments.
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Appendix
INSTITUTE CARGO CLAUSES in (A) (b) and (c)
DURATION
Transit Clause
8. 8.1

Subject to Clause 11 below, this insurance attaches from the time the
subject-matter insured is first moved in the warehouse or at the place of
storage (at the place named in the contract of insurance) for the purpose
of the immediate loading into or onto the carrying vehicle or other
conveyance for the commencement of transit, continues during the
ordinary course of transit and terminates either

8.1.1

on completion of unloading from the carrying vehicle or other
conveyance in or at the final warehouse or place of storage at the
destination named in the contract of insurance,

8.1.2

on completion of unloading from the carrying vehicle or other
conveyance in or at any other warehouse or place of storage,
whether prior to or at the destination named in the contract of
insurance, which the Assured or their employees elect to use either
for storage other than in the ordinary course of transit or for
allocation or distribution, or

8.1.3

When the Assured or their employees elect to use any carrying
vehicle or other conveyance or any container for storage other than
in the ordinary course of transit or

8.1.4

On the expiry of 60 days after completion of discharge overside of
the subject-matter insured from the oversea vessel at the final port
of discharge, whichever shall first occur.

8.2

If, after discharge overside from the oversea vessel at the final port of
discharge, but prior to termination of this insurance, the subject-matter
insured is to be forwarded to a destination other than that to which it is
insured, this insurance, whilst remaining subject to termination as
provided in Clauses 8.1.1 to 8.1.4, shall not extend beyond the time the
subject-matter insured is first moved for the purpose of the
commencement of transit to such other destination.

8.3

This insurance shall remain in force (subject to termination as provided
for in Clauses 8.1.1 to 8.1.4 above and to the provisions of Clause 9
below) during delay beyond the control of the Assured, any deviation,
forced discharge, reshipment or transshipment and during any variation
of the adventure arising from the exercise of a liberty granted to carriers
under the contract of carriage.
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Termination of Contract of Carriage
9. If owing to circumstances beyond the control of the Assured either the
contract of carriage is terminated at a port or place other than the
destination named therein or the transit is otherwise terminated before
unloading of the subject-matter insured as provided for in Clause 8
above, then this insurance shall also terminate unless prompt notice is
given to the Insurers and continuation of cover is requested when this
insurance shall remain in force, subject to an additional premium if
required by the Insurers, either
9.1 until the subject-matter insured is sold and delivered at such port or
place, or, unless otherwise specially agreed, until the expiry of 60
days after arrival of the subject-matter insured at such port or place,
whichever shall first occur, or
9.2 if the subject-matter insured is forwarded within the said period of
60 days (or any agreed extension thereof) to the destination named
in the contract of insurance or to any other destination, until
terminated in accordance with the provisions of Clause 8 above.
Change of Voyage
10. 10.1 where, after attachment of this insurance, the destination is
changed by the Assured, this must be notified promptly to Insurers
for rates and terms to be agreed. Should a loss occur prior to such
agreement being obtained cover may be provided but only if cover
would have been available at a reasonable commercial market rate
on reasonable market terms.
10.2Where the subject-matter insured commences the transit
contemplated by this insurance (in accordance with Clause 8.1),
but, without the knowledge of the Assured or their employees the
ship sails for another destination, this insurance will nevertheless
be deemed to have attached at commencement of such transit.
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شرط املدة يف التأمني البحري للبضائع على ضوء
النسخة األخرية الصادرة لشروط التأمني البحري
( دراسة مقارنة بني القانون األردني والربيطاني )
الدكتور حممود حممد القاسم عبابنه



كلية احلقوق  -جامعة الشرق األوسط

يهدف هذه البحث إىل مناقشة شروط املدة يف عقد التأمني البحري على البضائع كما ظهرت
يف نسختها املعدلة األخرية واليت أصدرها معهد مكتتيب التأمني البحري يف لندن ومجعية سوق
مؤسسة اللويدز يف العام  ،2009تربز أهمية هذا البحث من حقيقة أن معظم أسواق التأمني
البحري العربية مبا فيها سوق التأمني البحري األردني تعمل على تطبيق الشروط املعهدية لتأمني
البضائع املنقولة حبراً .إن مدة سريان عقد التأمني تعترب ركناً أساسياً يف عقد التأمني كونها حتدد
بدء وحاالت انتهاء غطاء التأمني .إن كثرياً من املنازعات يف التأمني البحري تتمركز حول
إشكاالت بدء وسريان وحاالت انتهاء عقد التأمني .لتعزيز فهم التعديالت اجلديدة فإننا حنتاج
للتعمق يف الشروط اجلديدة ملدة التأمني البحري لتجنب الصياغة احملدودة يف التشريعات البحرية
الوطنية املتعلقة مبدة التأمني البحري على البضائع.هذا البحث ينقسم إىل مقدمة عامة حتدد مالمح
املوضوع مدار البحث باإلضافة إىل خطة للبحث ومن ثم يتضمن فصل خاص بتحليل الشروط
مقارنة مع القانون الربيطاني وفصل أخر يتضمن أثر هذه التعديالت مقارنة مع قانون التجارة
البحرية األردني كنموذج لباقي التشريعات العربية.
الكلمات املفتاحية :شروط التأمني املعهدية على البضائع ،شروط املدة ،شرط النقل ،شرط
تغيري الرحلة ،قانون التجارة البحرية األردني.

 أستاذ القانون التجاري املساعد  -جامعة الشرق األوسط -األردن – عمان.
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